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Introduction 
 
 
 
From the publication of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR)1, the signs of improvement in 
both the world economy and the international financial markets have persisted, although they 
have been uneven across countries and market segments. In addition, these signs of 
improvement have coincided with recurring bouts of uncertainty and tension linked to a 
heightened perception of the risk associated with securities issued by the public sector. 
Notable in this connection are the difficulties of the Greek public finances, which in the early 
months of 2010 generated a contagion effect on investor perceptions of other euro area 
countries, including Spain. 
 
Compounding the lack of a full recovery in the international financial markets and the 
persistence of economic difficulties, Spanish deposit institutions have also been subject to 
risk arising from the adjustment of the real estate sector. Institutions' final losses from 
property development lending will depend on their ability to manage the risks assumed, on 
the effectiveness of the collateral taken and on the future performance of this sector.  
 
In this difficult setting, there have been widely varying impacts and responses among Spanish 
deposit institutions; that said, as indicated in previous FSRs, the downturn in economic 
activity is what has determined the behaviour of risks on bank balance sheets.  
 
Credit to the resident private sector has persisted in its downward trend, to the point of 
recording negative year-on-year rates of change. The economic downturn entails less 
demand for credit by firms and households, while institutions tighten their credit standards in 
response to deteriorating customer credit quality and increasing bad debts. Further, to the 
uncertainty surrounding the performance of the Spanish economy that still persisting on the 
international wholesale funding markets, must be added. A sharp reversal of credit behaviour 
in the coming months cannot be expected while the sector remains under this pressure.  
 
From a medium-term perspective, the growth rate of credit will tend to be more similar to that 
for the euro area as a whole and not like in the past, when the growth of this variable in Spain 
significantly exceeded the euro area average. Also over the medium term, the restructuring of 
households’ and firms’ balance sheets following the strong increase in leverage in the years 
prior to the crisis will continue apace, which will limit credit growth. 
 
Doubtful assets and, consequently, doubtful asset ratios continued to grow, recording high 
levels at end-2009, particularly in credit granted to the sectors whose performance is most 
closely linked to the economic cycle. In any event, despite the fact that this trend will persist 
in the coming months, doubtful assets are growing less sharply than in previous quarters.  
 
As indicated in previous FSRs, in connection with this worse performance of doubtful assets 
ratios, their dispersion across institutions is notable. That reflects differences in institutions’ 
risk management and selection ability before and after the crisis, taking specific form in the 
aforementioned heterogeneity of bad debts, even for institutions with similar strategies. 
 
The exposure to the construction and property development sector clearly exemplifies the 
foregoing. Not only is there a wide dispersion among institutions in respect of the weight of 
this type of lending in the total loan portfolio and in respect of the doubtful assets ratio of this 
 
1. The cut-off date for the present FSR was 24 March 2010. 
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lending, but also, when the degree of relative exposure is tied in with the related bad debts, 
there is no clear relationship between these two variables. That is to say, in institutions with 
high relative exposure to the construction and property development sector there is 
considerable dispersion of doubtful assets ratios, and the same goes for the other end of the 
spectrum, i.e. among institutions with low relative levels of exposure to construction and 
property development. 
 
The Spanish banking sector's exposure to construction and property development activities 
is a significant risk due to the high volume of loans and because the real estate sector is 
particularly coupled to the cyclical behaviour of the economy. The ultimate impact of this risk 
on the sector, which will be different for each institution, cannot be directly linked to the 
amount of exposure; rather, it will depend on the bad debts that materialise at each institution 
and on the effectiveness of the collateral taken. In any event, a portion of bad debts is 
covered both by specific provisions for impaired loans, and by the remainder of the general 
provisions set aside in the years prior to the crisis. 
 
The information available to the Banco de España indicates that the stock of provisions set 
aside may be in a position to absorb a loss of 35% of institutions' potentially troubled 
construction and property development loan portfolio without having to record any additional 
loss in their income statements. Note that this calculation does not consider either 
institutions' ability to generate recurring income or their own funds, which have increased 
substantially over the past year. 
 
Another factor of uncertainty stems from the situation on international financial markets, to 
which Spanish deposit institutions resorted in order to fund a part of the increase in their 
activity in the years prior to the crisis. Specifically, the signs of improvement have been 
uneven across market segments and countries, and they have been curtailed at the start of 
2010 by the emergence of the problems linked to Greek public debt. 
 
For the sector as a whole, the concentration of debt maturities in the medium and long term 
mitigates the need to obtain short-term funds, and further contributing to this were the 
Spanish government's programme of guarantees and use of Eurosystem liquidity facilities. In 
this respect, Government guarantees seem to have been used less frequently, although this 
programme remains open until June 2010, while funding from the ECB is more or less 
commensurate with the capital key and its weight in Spanish deposit institutions' bank 
balance sheets remains small (2%). 
 
In view of the ongoing difficulties on international financial markets, Spanish deposit 
institutions stepped up the business of taking retail deposits as early as 2008. In recent 
months, after posting high rates of change, the growth rate of deposits has slowed and 
converged with the rates seen for the euro area as a whole. 
 
Although the consolidated profit of Spanish deposit institutions compares favourably with that 
of other European banks, it has fallen in relation to that posted in 2008. Resilient recurring 
income (net operating margin) have been more than offset by the impact of increased bad 
debts, which resulted in the need for higher loan loss provisions. 
 
Downside risks to income remain in place due to stagnating activity; to narrower margins, in 
light of the exhaustion of the positive effect of the downward revision of the cost of liabilities 
attributable to lower interest rates; to increased competition for funding; and to the 
foreseeable persistence of loan loss provisioning requirements. 
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Although institutions have stepped up their efforts to contain operating costs, in the face of 
the above-mentioned downside risks the Spanish banking sector and, in particular, weaker 
institutions must adapt to the new domestic and international setting by streamlining their 
structure. 
 
Turning to solvency, there has been notable growth in institutions' own funds which has led 
to significant increases in their solvency ratios and, in particular, in the ratios of risks assumed 
to higher-quality capital.  
 
Such a significant strengthening of the tier 1 ratio and, in particular, of the more demanding 
core capital ratio, reflects the efforts by some Spanish deposit institutions to increase their 
resilience in the current difficult climate. Further and equally important, however, it leaves 
these institutions well placed to undertake the highly demanding changes which the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision is introducing in its stricter definition of capital and tighter 
requirements for the capital that financial institutions must hold in future. 
 
In conclusion, the economic situation remains difficult for financial institutions, and for Spanish 
deposit institutions there is a further risk arising from the adjustment of real estate 
development activities. Accordingly, and as reiterated in previous FSRs, it is desirable that 
restructuring be undertaken so as to adjust the sector’s capacity. The Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of Banks (FROB) is one mechanism that will contribute to facilitating this 
adjustment process for those institutions that need it. Although institutions have begun an 
adjustment process which has led them to strengthen their own funds, increase deposit-
taking and contain their operating costs, particularly through branch closures, restructuring is 
expected to continue in the coming months. In any event, it must not be overlooked that the 
greater uncertainty facing the banking sector in the medium run is that relating to 
developments in the real economy. Consequently, redressing the Spanish economy’s 
structural deficiencies that may hold back its recovery in the coming years will also be pivotal 
to the success of the restructuring process in the banking sector. 
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1   Macroeconomic risks and financial markets 
 
 
 
Since the last Financial Stability Report was published, there have been recurrent episodes of 
uncertainty and tension, some linked to specific financial institutions and others, particularly 
severe, linked to a higher perceived risk associated with public sector securities. Notable 
among the latter were the episodes connected with certain state-owned corporations, as in 
the case of Dubai, or with weak public finances, as in the case of Greece. However, despite 
the severity of some of these episodes, in the period as a whole the financial markets 
improved somewhat, although unevenly across different segments and markets. 
 
Capital market performance was driven by the improved expectations of economic recovery, 
which was once again uneven across different areas, and by an increased appetite for risk. 
This was reflected in the progress made in some areas in the withdrawal of the financial 
sector support measures (see Chapter 3). 
 
Against this backdrop, money markets remained steady at levels similar to those seen before 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Chart 1.1.A). Private issue markets recovered somewhat, 
especially in the case of firms with the lowest credit ratings, which, moreover, saw a decline in 
their risk premia (Chart 1.1.B). This was reflected in the high momentum of corporate debt 
issuance, particularly in late 2009 and early 2010, as a result of many firms’ refinancing needs 
and the scant availability of bank credit.  
 
On government debt markets, the improved economic outlook and rising net borrowing led to 
a rebound in long bond yields in the United States. By contrast, in the euro area long bond 
yields were conditioned by sovereign risk, remaining quite stable in Germany and rising in 
other economies, especially in Greece. In this setting, the dollar appreciated against the main 
currencies, trading against the euro at similar levels to those seen in mid-2009.  
 
Volatility indices declined somewhat on most financial markets, approaching their early-2007 
levels (Chart 1.1.C), while most of the world’s stock market indices rose (Chart 1.1.D).  
 
This pattern was temporarily interrupted in the first two months of 2010, mainly due to the 
doubts arising about certain countries’ sovereign risk. This episode of tension had most 
impact on the European markets, especially as a result of the uncertainty produced by the 
crisis in Greek public finances. Volatility rebounded, stock prices fell (particularly financials 
prices) and risk premia both on public and private sector securities rose. Nevertheless, 
following the European Union’s messages of support for Greece in mid-February, there was a 
certain recovery.  
 
Comparatively, the Spanish markets were harder hit by these developments than the 
European average; the long-term sovereign debt spread versus Germany widened to more 
than 100 bp and the IBEX 35 fell by more than 15% from the start of the year. By mid-March, 
however, when these tensions had diminished somewhat, the long-term sovereign debt 
spread had narrowed to 70 bp and the decline in the IBEX 35 was a more moderate 8.2%. 
Stock markets in the emerging countries continued to outperform those of the developed 
economies, although in this period the differences were smaller than in 2009 H1. 
 
Global economic activity quickened in 2009 H2 and the recovery spread to a growing number 
of economies. Thus world GDP rose, in quarter-on-quarter terms, by 1% in 2009 Q3 and by  
Improvement on the 
financial markets despite 
various - and occasionally 
severe - bouts of instability. 
The economic recovery has 
improved the short-term 
outlook for the financial 
sector. 
Money markets held stable 
and credit markets 
improved. 
Government debt yields 
differed across the various 
countries.  
Gains on stock markets 
were accompanied by a 
decline in volatility… 
… albeit with marked bouts 
of instability, such as that in 
the first two months of 2010 
associated with doubts over 
the sovereign risk of certain 
countries. 
In the second half of 2009 
the recovery spread to most  
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1.2% in 2009 Q4, compared with 0.8% in 2009 Q2. However, these growth rates are still 
slightly short of the average rates recorded in the years before the crisis. The emerging 
economies, especially the Asian economies (such as China and India) and Brazil, headed this 
recovery in activity, on the back of strong domestic demand due, in part, to fiscal policy 
stimuli. At the same time, rising commodity prices (especially industrial metal prices) boosted 
the recovery in parts of Latin America and in the oil-exporting countries. In turn, the increased 
momentum in the developed economies relied heavily on the extraordinary measures 
introduced to support domestic demand – particularly by means of fiscal stimulus packages – 
and on the reversal of the inventory cycle. However, the strength of the recovery differed 
somewhat among these economies; the United States posted one of the highest rates of 
growth, with GDP rising by 1.5% in quarter-on-quarter terms in 2009 Q4.  
 
The higher frequency indicators released in 2010 Q1 suggest that activity will continue to 
recover, albeit at a more moderate rate in the industrialised economies, as the transitory 
factors underpinning growth in 2009 H2 progressively lose strength. This was reflected in the 
closing months of 2009 and in early 2010, in the more or less across-the-board upward  
countries, but continued to 
be led by the emerging 
economies, especially the 
Asian economies. 
The recovery in activity 
continued in 2010 Q1, albeit 
at a slightly lesser pace. 
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revision of growth projections, which, however, on average was higher for emerging than 
industrialised economies, especially for 2011. 
 
In the euro area economic activity posted a modest rise in 2009 Q4. On Eurostat data, euro 
area GDP grew 0.1% quarter-on-quarter, 0.3 pp down on the previous quarter. In year-on-
year terms, GDP slipped 2.1%, two percentage points less than three months earlier and for 
the year as a whole it fell 4%, in comparison with 0.5% in 2008 (Chart 1.2.A). In the medium-
term, international organisations' most recent projections point to a slow economic recovery, 
although the uncertainty and risks in this respect remain high. Specifically, the ECB's March 
projections put the growth rate at between 0.4% and 1.2% in 2010 and at between 0.5% 
and 2.5% in 2011. 
 
In Spain, at the tail-end of last year the contractionary trajectory of economic activity 
continued, although the pace of decline eased. Thus, between October and December GDP 
fell 0.1%, in quarter-on-quarter terms, compared with the 0.3% drop posted three months 
earlier. The year-on-year rate stood at -3.1%, 0.9 pp above the figure for the previous quarter 
(Chart 1.2.A). These developments were reflected in the labour market where, according to 
the EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) job destruction continued, although at a slightly 
slower pace. As a result of this and of movements in the labour force, the unemployment rate 
rose (it stood at 18.8% at end-2009, Chart 1.2.B). The most recent data indicate that this 
trend will continue in the opening months of 2010. 
 
In spite of the contraction of private-sector borrowing, the weak income growth seems to 
have prevented a decline in debt ratios, especially corporate ones. Thus, household and 
corporate debt ratios remained at high levels. Nevertheless, the drop in the cost of borrowing 
continued to be reflected, during the closing months of 2009, in further declines in the interest 
burden of indebted agents. The most recent information on net household wealth, which 
relates to 2009 Q3, shows that it is relatively stable, following the downward trend of previous 
months which began in 2008.  
Economic growth in the 
euro area increased 
modestly in the final stretch 
of 2009 and the 
macroeconomic projections 
for 2010 and 2011 point to 
a path of slow recovery.  
Economic activity in Spain 
shrank once again in 2009 
Q4, albeit at a more moderate 
pace than in the previous 
quarters, prompting a further 
increase in the unemployment 
rate. 
Private-sector debt ratios 
remained high, though the 
fall in interest rates 
continued to lighten the 
interest burden. 
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General government borrowing has been growing rapidly (at nearly 30%) as a result of the 
increase in the budget deficit, which stood at 11.2% of GDP for 2009 as a whole, and the rise 
in financial investment. This development, together with the decline in GDP, was reflected in a 
rise in the debt/GDP ratio (up from 39.7% at end-2008 to 53.2% at end-2009) and an 
increase in the debt burden, in spite of low interest rates. 
 
In short, during the last part of 2009 the macro-economic situation continued to deteriorate in 
Spain, albeit more moderately than in previous months, and this continued to be reflected in 
rising unemployment. As a result, it is estimated that the level of financial pressure borne by 
certain sectors continued to increase, especially in those sectors with higher levels of debt 
and in those hit hardest by the cyclical position of the economy.  
 
 
Public sector debt ratios and 
interest burdens increased 
following the notable increase 
in liabilities. 
Economic weakness in Spain 
meant that the proportion of 
agents subject to high 
financial pressure continued 
to rise. 
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2   Deposit institutions and other financial market participants 
 
 
 
The current juncture continues to be difficult for Spanish deposit institutions. The persisting 
weakness of the real economy lessens the credit quality of bank balance sheets. Particularly 
difficult is the situation of the real estate market, especially in regard to the property 
development sector, where adjustment continues under way. Hence the appropriate 
management of the risks deriving from institutions' exposures to this sector is of great 
importance. The ultimate losses of each institution will depend on that management capacity, 
on the quality of the risks assumed (in a type of lending characterised by consisting of very 
diverse loans) and on the effectiveness of collateral. And for these reasons the potential 
losses are not associated simply with the volume of credit granted.  
 
The situation for the banking sector is also difficult because the positive signs observed in 
international financial markets have not given rise to a fully consummated improvement in 
financing conditions on wholesale markets. Thus the securitisation market remains closed, 
and others such as the interbank or senior debt markets are still not completely open to small 
and medium-sized institutions. Situations such as that of Greece, and in particular its 
contagion effect on the way in which financial market participants perceive various 
economies, including that of Spain, have the effect of widening sovereign debt spreads and 
make it harder for institutions to access the international funding markets. Moreover, the 
uncertainty as to when and how central banks and governments will withdraw public 
measures to support the banking sector is another risk to be considered. 
 
In this scenario, the impacts on and responses by Spanish deposit institutions varied greatly. 
Although the sector as a whole has tools with which to confront this situation, the 
restructuring of some institutions would appear to be inevitable.1 The Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of Banks (FROB) will not only act when tensions affect a specific institution, but 
will also assist in the adjustment process of the sector by downsizing and strengthening it. 
 
The total consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions (Table 2.1) grew by 3% in 
December 2009 with respect to the previous year2 (8.8% in December 2008 and 14.7% in 
December 2007). Deposit institutions are not all performing the same in terms of total assets, 
but their relative importance within the sector as a whole has varied little (Table 2.1). 
 
The moderate growth of consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions, noted in 
previous FSRs, is basically due to the behaviour of financing to the private sector (credit plus 
fixed income), which in December 2009 remained at the levels of the previous year.3 The 
behaviour of financing to the private sector is mainly explained by that of credit extension, the 
downward trend of which is consistent with the situation of the Spanish economy, due both 
to lower demand and to the more demanding stance of institutions towards their borrowers in 
the face of rising bad debts, and with the persisting difficulties in the international wholesale 
funding markets.  
 
The total doubtful assets on consolidated balance sheets grew by 48% in December 2009. 
This rate is high, but lower than in previous reports (171% in June 2009 and 239% in
 
1. Box 2.1 explains the Banco de España's action regarding CajaSur.     2. This increase in the consolidated balance 
sheet is further raised by the change in the scope of consolidation of a large Spanish institution. Excluding this institution 
from the analysis, the increase in total assets is ,more moderate (2.1%).      3. Excluding the effect of the changes in the 
scope of consolidation of a large Spanish institution, the year-on-year rate of change of financing to the private sector is 
-2.8%. 
2.1 Deposit institutions 
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS 
 
The persisting contraction in 
the real economy, and in 
particular the adjustment in 
the real estate sector,... 
 
 
… and the failure of the 
improvement in the 
wholesale funding markets 
to firm in full, shape an 
economic setting which 
remains difficult for deposit 
institutions ... 
… and which affects 
different institutions to 
varying degrees of intensity. 
Consolidated assets are 
growing at a moderate rate 
that is lower than in previous 
years,… 
… due essentially to 
developments in financing to 
the private sector. 
Bad debts at the 
consolidated level continued 
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA ACTION IN CAJASUR                  BOX  2.1 
 
The Banco de España Executive Commission meeting of 29 July 2009 
approved the action plan that was requested of CajaSur and was 
submitted jointly by Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Córdoba 
(CajaSur) and Montes de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Ronda, Cádiz, 
Almería, Málaga y Antequera (Unicaja) in accordance with the provisions 
of Articles 10 and 11 of Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December 1996 
on credit institution deposit guarantee funds, in order to carry out the 
restructuring needed at CajaSur (at December 2009 this institution 
recorded a loss of €596 million, equivalent to 3.1% of its total assets). 
 
This plan forms part of the merger process between these two institutions 
that includes, inter alia, additional write-downs of assets of CajaSur and 
the rationalisation of management structures and of resources to enhance  
efficiency. The support of the Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund is 
established for the resulting entity; this support will consist of: 
 
- The granting by the Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund of an asset 
protection scheme associated with a closed portfolio. A maximum loss of 
€550 million would be assumed by the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the 
duration would be five years from the grant date.   
 
- The acquisition of €440 million of preference shares by the Savings Bank 
Deposit Guarantee Fund to strengthen the solvency of the new savings 
bank, with indefinite maturity and earning fixed interest for the first 17 
years. The resulting institutions’ solvency ratio will stand comfortably 
above the recommended levels in 2011 and 2012. 
 
 
 
December 2008). The increase in doubtful assets and the sluggishness of lending explain why 
the doubtful assets ratio4 increased by 1.1 percentage points (pp) with respect to December 
2008 (3.6% in December 2009), although its pace has also slowed (in June 2009 the ratio 
was 3.3%). As noted below, the doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector in Spain 
has followed a similar pattern, i.e. it has increased, reaching 5% in December 2009, but at a 
slower pace. In any case, as long as the real economy remains weak, bad debts will, as 
noted in previous FSRs, continue to rise. 
 
On the liabilities side, the rate of change of deposits from central banks decreased, as did cash 
and balances with central banks (asset-side item). Like the institutions of other euro area countries, 
Spanish institutions had greater recourse to the liquidity provided by the ECB, as reflected by the 
higher net lending (the funds received in liquidity providing operations minus those deposited in 
liquidity withdrawal operations). ECB funding to Spanish institutions (Eurosystem net lending) is in 
line with the size of the Spanish economy in the euro area (see Chart 2.5.D) and its weight in bank 
balance sheets remains low (2% in December 2009, Table 2.1). 
 
Despite the improvement in recent months, the wholesale funding markets remain in a difficult 
situation subject to uncertainty, which explains the fall-off of 1% in the marketable debt 
securities item. However, the year-on-year rate of change of this variable was -4.8% in June 
2009 and -4.3% in December 2008. In consonance with these signs of improvement, 
subordinated debt grew by 13% in December 2009 (1.2% in December 2008).  
 
Spanish deposit institutions have increased the deposits taken from the private sector, which 
in December 2009 grew year-on-year by 6%,5 although the pace has slowed in recent 
months. 
 
Spanish deposit institutions have strengthened their own funds, which grew at a rate of 7% 
in December 2009, their weight in bank balance sheets rising from 5.5% in December 2008 
to 5.7% in December 2009 (Table 2.1). 
 
4. As is customary practice in the FSR, the terms bad debts and doubtful assets are used as synonyms, although 
technically doubtful assets include others in addition to those in arrears.     5. Excluding the effect of changes in the 
scope of consolidation of a large Spanish institution, the growth rate of deposits is more subdued, standing at 1.2%, 
although exceeding that of credit to the sector. 
to rise, but at a lower rate 
than in previous quarters. 
Funds obtained from the 
ECB held stable in relation 
to the capital key, and their 
weight in the consolidated 
balance sheet was low. 
Deposits grew, but at a 
lower rate than in previous 
quarters. 
Spanish institutions 
strengthened their own 
funds. 
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BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION PLANS (LIVING WILLS)                   BOX 2.2 
 
As a mitigating factor of the high cost of a potential public bail-out of 
major systemic banking groups, and of the moral hazard associated 
therewith, international fora are studying the co-ordinated adoption of a 
series of measures. These include most notably capital and liquidity 
surcharges, restrictions on size and activity, various types of taxes on 
banking activity, and the drawing up of recovery and resolution plans, also 
known as living wills.  
 
Living wills are documents that reflect how prepared a bank and the 
supervisory authorities are when faced with a crisis. Broadly, living wills 
comprise two different parts: the first envisages the last-resort measures 
that the group would adopt to sustain its core business and avert 
collapse; the second contains the measures that the authorities would 
adopt to wind up the institution in an orderly fashion without causing 
market dislocations. In addition, the living will also includes the information 
needed to undertake the recovery or resolution process.  
 
There will be an individualised plan for each major international group, 
approved in a co-ordinated manner by the home authorities of the parents 
and the host authorities of its significant subsidiaries. These will be called 
on to manage potential financial crises that may affect systemic banks, 
and will be assigned to “crisis management groups”. The composition, 
organisation and functioning of these groups will be eminently flexible, 
involving the relevant institutions in each situation. These institutions will 
be the designated supervisors of the group, the national central banks and  
 
the finance ministries of the countries concerned, although the authorities 
responsible for resolutions and deposits guarantee schemes may also be 
included. They are scheduled to meet at least once a year, or even more 
frequently if necessary. 
 
The existence of these contingency plans, which must be kept updated, is 
useful to a degree beyond specific crisis-management measures; living 
wills are in fact a very important instrument for the authorities in exercising 
regular supervision and also for managers in terms of the proper 
administration of their group.  
 
The Banco de España has traditionally set great store by prudent 
management, with the appropriate control of risks. While it does not 
impose any structure on institutions under its supervision, the organisation 
adopted by the major groups is a significant factor of analysis for the 
supervisor. In addition, the international expansion of Spanish banks has 
typically unfolded via subsidiaries with a high degree of financial 
autonomy. This subsidiaries-based structure contributes, better than other 
organisational structures, to segregating the various group units from 
episodes of crisis originating in other units, providing for their orderly 
resolution and, consequently, for the drawing up and viability of these 
plans. If, under this framework, moves are made to impose prudential 
surcharges on systemic institutions, the presence of viable living wills is a 
factor to be taken into account that may mitigate systemic risk.  
 
  
 
The relative weight of business abroad, measured in terms of total assets, was 23.6%, up 
2 pp on December 2008, largely explained by the acquisitions made by a large Spanish 
institution. Over the last few years Spanish institutions have further diversified their assets 
located abroad, initially concentrated in Latin America, towards countries in the European 
Union and the United States. The risks associated with these exposures currently remain 
contained, to which may be added the structural characteristics of the typical model of 
expansion of Spanish banks through subsidiaries enjoying a high degree of financial 
autonomy (see Box 2.2). 
 
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain intensified its downward trend since the 
publication of the previous FRS, posting negative rates of change in December 2009 for 
deposit institutions as a whole (-2%, against 1% in June 2009 and 6% in December 2008). 
The latest available data, relating to January 2010, show that this trend persists, with credit 
dropping by -2.7% year-on-year. 
 
The difficult conditions faced by the Spanish economy explain this trend in credit to the 
resident private sector, a trend which will foreseeably persist in the coming months. The 
worsening of the economic cycle implies that firms and households will demand less credit, 
and that institutions will tighten their credit standards in response to deteriorating customer 
credit quality and increasing doubtful loans. Also, to the uncertainty surrounding the 
behaviour of the Spanish economy must be added that still persisting in the international 
wholesale funding markets. In any event, the expected values of future changes in credit 
should be much more in line with those prevailing in the euro area than with those in the 
Spanish banking system in the first half of this decade (Chart 2.1.A). 
The weight of business 
abroad increased relative to 
2008, but the risks arising 
from these exposures 
remained contained. 
The downward trend of 
credit to the resident private 
sector in Spain intensified,... 
... owing to lower demand 
and to deteriorating 
customer credit quality, 
leading institutions to tighten 
their credit standards. 
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The evidence available does not confirm that the institutions that are facing greater 
uncertainty and difficulties are granting less credit than their peers. However, in the future 
these difficulties may ultimately affect credit growth at these institutions. The FROB has been 
designed specifically to prevent this risk from materialising. 
 
When credit growth rates are analysed for each individual institution against variables 
reflecting their economic-financial situation (doubtful assets ratios, solvency, profitability, etc.), 
the correlations obtained between these variables and credit growth are very weak. 
Moreover, this is confirmed by anecdotal evidence: some institutions that are not facing 
significant difficulties post higher-than-sector-average rates of decline in credit, while for 
others that are facing more difficulties the situation is quite the opposite. 
 
Credit is decelerating in the various business segments (Chart 2.1.B). Lending to households 
for house purchase still shows positive year-on-year rates of change (0.6% in December 
2009), although they are low and the trend is one of deceleration. The differences between 
this type of lending and household consumer credit explain why the latter has shown negative 
rates of growth since end-2008, standing at -5.4% in December 2009. However, since mid-
2009 the sharpness of the fall in consumer loans to households has tended to ease. 
The slowdown in credit is 
across the board. It is 
sharpest in household 
consumer credit... 
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Within non-financial corporations, the credit behaviour of construction and property 
development firms disregarding foreclosures is more negative, recording a negative rate of 
change of 4.1% in December 2009, after having grown at rates above 40% in late 2006. 
Credit to other non-financial corporations also fell in December 2009, but both its negative 
rate of change (-2.9%) and its deceleration were less sharp. 
 
The slowdown in credit to non-financial corporations extends across all firm sizes, although a 
certain relationship can be observed which indicates that credit to smaller firms, as measured 
by their bank debt, is falling off most sharply (Chart 2.2.A). This order was also apparent 
when credit was growing more strongly. However, as shown by Chart 2.2.A, the gap in loan 
growth rates between larger firms and smaller ones, which favours the former, closed in 2009 
and the traditional differences, still discernable until July 2009, dissipated. This order is the 
inverse of that of the doubtful assets ratio of non-financial corporations based on size, 
measured in the same way (Chart 2.2.B); that is to say, and this phenomenon is all the more 
marked in the present circumstances, credit institutions closely link the granting of credit to 
the credit quality of the potential borrower. 
 
Doubtful assets of the resident private sector in Spain grew by 45.3% year-on-year in 
December 2009 (33.8% in January 2010, the most recent figure available). Although this 
growth rate continues to be high, the rate of increase of doubtful assets has moderated 
significantly over the last few months (Chart 2.3.A). 
 
The doubtful assets ratio of credit to the resident private sector in Spain for deposit 
institutions as a whole stood at 5% in December 2009 (4.5% in June 2009 and 3.3% in 
December 2008). The ratio remains high and continues to trend upwards, as confirmed by 
the most recent data (5.2% in January 2010), although in recent months a more moderate 
pace has been observed in the different sectors of activity (Chart 2.3.B). In any event, the 
... and in construction and 
property development firms. 
For firms, the slowdown in 
credit has generally been 
irrespective of their size, 
although it has diminished 
somewhat more sharply for 
those which, on the basis of 
their size, have a higher 
doubtful assets ratio. 
Doubtful assets of the 
resident private sector in 
Spain grew, but less 
sharply,  ... 
... on a par with the doubtful 
assets ratio, whose growth 
was less sharp for the 
different sectors of activity. 
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upward trend will foreseeably persist in the coming months, at least while there are no clear 
signs of improvement in real activity and employment. 
 
The doubtful assets ratio is higher in those sectors whose performance is most closely linked 
to the economic cycle (Chart 2.3.C). Thus, within household credit there are notable 
differences between lending for house purchase (2.8% in December 2009) and that for other 
purposes, basically consumption (6% in December 2009). Housing loans represent 82% of 
total household credit (36% of credit to the resident private sector) and their lower doubtful 
assets ratio has already been observed in previous recessions in Spain. In 1993 the doubtful 
assets ratio of housing loans was 4%, compared with a ratio of 8.5% for total loans. Lending 
for house purchase traditionally has a lower doubtful assets ratio because of the type of 
The doubtful assets ratio is 
higher, and has been 
growing more sharply, in the 
sectors whose behaviour is 
more closely linked to the 
business cycle, such as 
household consumer 
credit... 
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business in which Spanish banks engage and because of the particular features of the asset 
acquired. In Spain not only is there a high percentage of owner-occupied housing, but also 
the vast majority of home loans are first mortgages (nine out of every ten), and, of these, most 
(80%) are for purchase of the principal residence. The existence of collateral, and, in 
particular, the loan amount as a percentage of the collateral value (loan to value, LTV), limits 
the potential loss of institutions in the event of default. 81% of mortgage loans to households 
in Spain have an LTV below 80% (Chart 2.3.D). 
 
The incidence of doubtful assets in credit to the business sector is the inverse of that for 
credit to households, and is significantly higher for firms in the sectors most closely linked to 
the real estate cycle (Chart 2.3.C). Thus, the doubtful assets ratio of construction and 
property development loans was 9.6% in December 2009 while that of lending to all other 
... and especially credit to 
construction and property 
development firms. 
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firms as a whole was significantly lower (3.9% in December 2009). As reiterated in previous 
FSRs, construction and property development lending is typically more risky than other types 
of financing because of its highly pronounced cyclical profile. Thus, in 1993 the doubtful 
assets ratio of real estate loans amply exceeded that of total credit, standing at 13%. In the 
current circumstances, in which the adjustment of the real estate market in Spain persists, 
complicated by its excessive growth in the past, it can be considered that the doubtful assets 
ratio of loans to firms linked to the property development sector has not yet reached its peak. 
 
As argued in previous FSRs, the degree of sectoral exposure and the behaviour of the real 
economy cannot be considered the only factors explaining the doubtful assets ratio. This is 
apparent in the high degree of dispersion of the doubtful assets ratio in recessions, which is a 
reflection of the different credit policies pursued by institutions in the past (Chart 2.4.A). 
 
 
 
EXPOSURE OF SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS TO THE PROPERTY SECTOR                   BOX 2.3 
 
The exposure to the construction and property development sector 
represents a significant risk for the Spanish banking sector. This risk is not 
only due to the fact that the property sector, which is markedly cyclical, is 
immersed in a very sharp adjustment process, but also because the 
banking system’s volume of exposure in this sector (€445 billion in 
December 2009) is high. 
 
The volume of exposure to the sector is not, however, equal to the 
potential loss for the financial system. Placing exposure and potential loss 
on the same footing means considering, first, that 100% of the borrowers 
comprising this exposure will ultimately default on their contractual 
obligations [i.e. it means assuming a probability of default (PD) of 100%]. 
Second, it also presumes that institutions will have nil capacity to recover 
troubled loans and the (normally mortgage) collateral securing them (loss 
given default, or LGD, of 100%). Both assumptions, all the more so 
considering that the type of financing comprising this exposure is usually 
secured by collateral, are unrealistic. 
 
The above-mentioned amount of exposure (€445 billion) includes all loans 
extended to construction and property development firms.1 It has been 
decided to treat both sectors jointly because the boundaries between the 
two, in terms of their statistical classification, are occasionally blurred, and 
it is not surprising that institutions reclassify loans from one sector to the 
other. However, not all loans to construction and property development 
entail exposure to the residential construction and property development 
sector, where the adjustment problems are concentrated. Indeed, firms 
from these sub-sectors are active in the energy, airport infrastructure and 
oil markets, inter alia. Further, construction activity arising from public 
investment in railway or highway infrastructure does not pose particular 
difficulties either. If exposure to these two activities (estimated at around 
€43 billion) is subtracted, the exposure associated with residential 
construction and development stands at around €402 billion for deposit 
institutions as a whole (commercial banks, savings banks and credit 
cooperatives). 
 
1. Note that, as is usually the case in the FSR, deposit institutions as a whole are 
being considered, i.e. commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives, 
which excludes specialised credit institutions (SCIs) from the analysis. Beyond the 
consistency of this approach with the rest of the FSR, it should be stressed that 
SCIs are a very small sub-sector relative to the other institutions, as is also the 
case for their exposure to the property development sector. 
 
Of the total exposure to the construction and property development 
sector, institutions' classified doubtful loans amount to €42.8 billion (9.6% 
of exposure). These are loans in which some instalment has not been paid 
for a period of more than 90 days, and those exposures in which there are 
reasonable doubts as to total repayment under the terms agreed (cases 
such as negative equity, ongoing losses and inappropriate financial 
structure). Moreover, the classification of a loan as doubtful interrupts the 
accrual of interest and requires specific provisions to be set aside. The 
amount of the provisions set aside by institutions for these loans is €17.7 
billion, meaning that their coverage with specific provisions is 41.4%. 
 
Of the total amount of exposure, €59 billion relate to substandard loans. 
These are loans showing some general weakness associated with the fact 
they are to a specific troubled group or sector, meaning that the risk of 
the transactions increases, but does not translate into losses for the 
borrower (they are not loans more than 90 days past-due nor are there 
other objective signs of borrower weakness requiring them to be classified 
as doubtful). Provisions are also required for these loans, and the amount 
provided is €7.6 billion, i.e. the coverage by specific provisions is 12.9%. 
 
As is customary and desirable in a crisis situation such as the present 
one, credit institutions use tools to manage doubtful loans. In its 
supervisory capacity, the Banco de España analyses these tools in detail 
to prevent them from becoming potential mechanisms to defer the 
recognition of losses. 
 
In exposures relating to the construction and property development 
sector, and as loans secured by collateral are involved, habitual tools are 
asset foreclosures, dation in payment and acquisitions. Asset ownership 
passes to the credit institutions, either as a result of legal debt-
enforcement proceedings (foreclosure), of standard debt-settlement 
procedures between the debtor and the credit institution (dation), or of 
acquisitions. These assets amount to €59.7 billion.2 Here, too, the Banco 
 
2. This amount is potentially biased upwards, as there is overlap between 
exposure to the sector and acquisitions. For example, financing granted by an 
institution to its real estate subsidiary to acquire assets from property 
developers will be counted twice, as an exposure to the sector and also as an 
acquisition. 
The doubtful assets ratio 
shows a high degree of 
dispersion across 
institutions, ... 
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de España requires provisions for these assets held on balance sheets. 
The related provisions amount to €13 billion, entailing coverage of 21.8%. 
 
Loan refinancing is another management tool used by institutions. The 
accounting treatment for the purpose of provisioning is, as a general rule, 
that it should not interrupt the calculation of doubtful assets (unless there 
is reasonable certainty that the customer can meet the payment or new 
effective collateral is provided). In any event, they will be classified as 
normal, doubtful or substandard loans depending on the particular 
characteristics, and they will therefore be subject to the related provisions 
and, moreover, to supervision by the Banco de España. 
 
Finally, the loan write-offs pertaining to the sector amount to €4 billion 
and, as required by accounting legislation, are covered in full by 
provisions. 
 
Accordingly, the potentially troubled exposure (the sum of doubtful assets, 
substandard loans, foreclosures, dations in payment and acquisitions, as 
well as loan write-offs) amounts to €165.5 billion. All the loans grouped in 
this category show, albeit to differing degrees, some sign of potential 
problems and Banco de España accounting rules therefore require 
specific provisions be set aside. The amount of the specific provisions in 
December 2009 was €42.3 billion, entailing coverage of potentially 
troubled exposure of 25%. 
 
The arrangements for loan loss coverage in Spain also involves general 
provisions, whereby deposit institutions have a stock of general provisions 
set aside during economic upturns. Including this stock, but not in its 
entirety (provisions relating to business abroad are excluded), the 
coverage of potentially troubled exposure rises to 35%. This means that 
the sector as a whole could absorb a loss of 35% of its potentially 
troubled construction and property development portfolio3 without having 
to record any additional loss in the income statement. 
 
Coverage via the provisions already set aside by institutions is not the only 
line of defence against the losses that might arise from potential problem 
loans; regard should also be had to their ability to generate profits. In 
2009 Spanish deposit institutions' recurring income (net operating margin)  
 
 
3. Note that the value of the collateral backing this type of loan is usually 
greater than the book value of the loans (almost 87.3% of the collateralised 
loans granted to developers have an LTV of less than 80%), meaning that this 
percentage (35%) may be higher. 
grew by 18%, despite the difficult economic and financial environment in 
which activity was pursued. Assuming a level of recurring income in 
2010 equal to that observed in 2009, deposit institutions as a whole 
have a coverage of potentially troubled exposure to the construction 
and property development sector of 71%. Predicting the future 
course of such income is a matter of judgement and, therefore, 
subject to numerous discussions about the assumptions and 
scenarios used. But, in any event, in the light of the foregoing data, it 
appears that the sector as a whole has provisions in place for 
declines of over 50% in the average realisable value of collateral, 
without having to record additional losses. And this estimate does not 
consider the own funds that institutions hold, which were notably 
strengthened in 2009. 
 
The foregoing data refer to deposit institutions as a whole. But as 
mentioned throughout this FSR (see Chart 2.4), there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity across institutions, not only in terms of their relative 
exposure to the construction and property development sector, but also 
in terms of how institutions are responding and their ability to withstand 
such exposure.  
 
Heterogeneity can also be seen in the collateral for this type of 
financing, which affects both the effectiveness thereof and, 
therefore, the ability of institutions to recover loans. This requires 
prudent valuation since, for instance, not all collateral becomes 
market-ready and can be converted into cash at the same pace 
(finished housing in established urban zones as opposed to, for 
example, buildable land). 
 
In any case, the FROB is a suitable mechanism for institutions that 
show less resilience and greater difficulties in resolving their 
problems. The sphere of action of the FROB is not confined solely to 
the restructuring of institutions that show weaknesses affecting their 
viability; it is also designed to promote merger and acquisition 
processes between institutions which, without being in grave danger, 
seek to improve their efficiency and adjust their size and capacity in 
the medium-term through the reinforcement of their own funds. 
 
Beyond having a mechanism such as that described to facilitate 
adjustment, tackling the current difficulties certain institutions face involves 
increasing the information they convey to the market about their 
potentially troubled exposure, the degree of coverage and their loan 
recovery and management policies. 
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The relevance of institutions' credit policies to loan selection and risk management is clearly 
illustrated by the case of lending to construction and property development firms in Spain. 
The exposure to the construction and property development sector is, for the reasons stated 
above and in view of its volume, a significant risk for the Spanish banking sector. To value this 
exposure adequately, it must be taken into account not only that it affects institutions 
unevenly, but also that the volume of the exposure cannot be related to the potential loss of 
the sector (see Box 2.3). 
 
The wide range of the exposure to construction and property development firms is 
reflected both in their weight in institutions’ credit portfolios (Chart 2.4.B) and in deposit 
institutions’ doubtful assets ratios associated with this exposure (Chart 2.4.C). Moreover, 
if exposure to and default on this type of credit are analysed together, it is clear that 
different institutions have selected and manage these risks differently. Indeed there is 
substantial dispersion between institutions, as some have high exposure and very low 
doubtful assets ratios in this credit segment while, at the other end of the scale, others 
have low exposure but high doubtful assets ratios (Chart 2.4.D). 
 
How institutions handle the impact of these higher doubtful assets ratios depends not 
only on their ability to generate recurring income, but also on the loan loss provisions 
established to this effect. This is especially relevant in the case of Spain, due to the 
system of specific provisions based on clear, transparent and objective rules, and to the 
dynamic provisioning system which has enabled institutions to make provisions against 
retained earnings during the last cyclical upturns (see Box 2.4). 
 
 
 
SPAIN’S DYNAMIC PROVISIONING SYSTEM                   BOX 2.4 
 
On information at December 2009, the stock of specific provisions continues 
to grow, and now amounts to almost 1.5% of all loans and receivables, 
while in line with the automatic mechanism of dynamic provisioning, the 
stock of general provisions continues to decline as a percentage of lending, 
standing at around 0.5% at end-2009 (Panel A). As a result of these 
contrasting patterns, the stock of total provisions as a percentage of total 
loans and receivables continues to grow, but at a much lower rate than 
specific provisions. This is a fundamental characteristic of the Spanish 
provisioning system, as amended in 2004 to adapt it to IFRS: total 
provisions increase in downturns, although to a lesser extent than if the 
countercyclical mechanism did not exist, signifying that total provisions are 
less procyclical, without being completely insensitive to the cycle. 
 
Coverage levels through general provisions vary between institutions, 
according to the degree of use which, in turn, depends on the specific 
provisions and, in short, on the doubtful asset ratios. Thus, among the 
deposit institutions that represent 95% of total credit to the private 
resident sector, the stock of general provisions as a percentage of loans 
and receivables ranges from 1.49% to 0.02%, a clear indication of the 
different past performance of institutions’ lending policies and of their 
reflection in current doubtful assets and the attendant write-down. 
The flow of provisions follows a similar pattern (Panel B), clearly reflecting 
the macroprudential effect (lower procyclicality) inherent in the Spanish 
provisioning system: between mid-2007, when lending entered a phase of 
deceleration, and end-2009, the flow of specific provisioning as a 
percentage of loans and receivables grew more than tenfold, while the 
flow of total provisions merely doubled.  
 
The countercyclical mechanism of dynamic provisioning is based on the 
comparison between expected losses and specific provisions. Indeed, in 
algebraic terms, Spain’s loan loss provisions may be written as a function 
of the expected loss in each of the six credit portfolios considered. It is 
precisely this expected loss approach that the IASB (International 
Accounting Standard Board) is moving towards since publishing, in 
November 2009, its proposal for a new methodology for determining the 
level of loan loss provisions.1 
 
If this proposal comes into effect, the present incurred loss model will be 
replaced by an expected loss model, an approach that has underpinned 
the Spanish provisioning model since mid-2000. Nevertheless, the specific 
 
1. Spain played an active role in the debate promoted by the IASB for 
improving the provisioning system. In this respect, see 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/secciones/prensa/intervenpub/diregen/regula/r
egula170609e.pdf. 
...which not only depends 
on their relative exposures, 
but most significantly on 
their credit and credit risk 
management policies. 
Thus, in exposure to the 
construction and property 
development sector, both 
the relative weight in the 
credit portfolio and the 
associated doubtful assets 
ratios vary significantly from 
institution to institution. 
The possibility of withstanding 
the potential losses arising from 
doubtful assets depends on 
institutions' loan recoverability 
capacity (LGD), on their 
recurring income and on the 
provisions they have made.           
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form of the IASB proposal may make a review of the calculation 
methodology used for Spanish provisioning advisable. 
 
In short, Spain’s dynamic provisioning system has reduced, in a 
transparent manner, the procyclicality of specific provisions and, therefore, 
the impact on institutions’ income statements, just when these statements  
are under great pressure. This is precisely the situation in which the 
advantages of this provisioning model, both from a micro- and a 
macroprudential standpoint, come into play, even though, naturally, and 
given the magnitude of the current economic and financial crisis, this may 
not be sufficient to ensure that all institutions are able to accommodate all 
the credit risk exposure on their balance sheets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding conditions in the international financial markets remain tight for financial 
institutions, as the signs of improvement seen in these markets in recent months were 
interrupted by the emergence of the problems connected with Greece’s public finances. 
The package of temporary and extraordinary measures introduced by governments and 
central banks to stave off a widespread loss of confidence, which prompted a shutdown 
among the main wholesale funding markets, remain in place (see Chapter 3). The timing 
and pace of their withdrawal is currently one of the most difficult questions facing 
economic and financial policymakers. 
 
One indication that the international financial markets are still not fully recovered is that 
some markets that were key before summer 2007 (such as the securitisations market) 
remain firmly closed. Others, such as the interbank market, are still not operating 
normally. 
 
The episode relating to Greece’s economic problems reflected this persistent uncertainty 
and lack of market confidence. At the peak of the uncertainty surrounding the difficulties 
in Greece, the sovereign credit spreads of other euro area countries, including Spain, 
tightened significantly, and this despite the differences between the economic reality of 
the two countries.  
 
In any case, the market perception of Spain’s economic difficulties with respect to its 
debt levels and the need for economic adjustment – to the extent that it tightens 
sovereign credit spreads – will make it more difficult for Spanish deposit institutions, and 
especially those the market perceives to be the weakest players, to obtain financing. The 
CDS spreads of the big Spanish institutions have traditionally outperformed the average 
Conditions on wholesale 
funding markets remain 
difficult, ... 
... and are compounded by 
the contagion effects of 
situations such as that of the 
Greek economy ... 
... and the uncertainty 
arising for investors from the 
adjustment of the Spanish 
economy. 
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of their European peers, except at the point of maximum tension connected with the 
difficulties in Greece (Chart 2.5.A).  
 
In this still uncertain environment, Spain’s larger institutions, which had been able to 
access the senior debt markets throughout 2009, placed around €4.5 billion in senior 
debt at the beginning of 2010 (Chart 2.5.B). Issues of covered bonds (excluding 
securitisations), one of the market segments most affected by the international financial 
crisis, amounted to approximately €22 billion in 2009 and a number of institutions gained 
access to this market in early 2010. 
 
The difficulties involved in accessing international funding markets, especially for 
institutions that the market perceives as weak, explain why, in 2009, the volume of debt 
issuance backed by State guarantee exceeded that of senior debt issuance (Chart 
2.5.B). In the opening months of 2010, debt issues backed by State guarantee totalled 
€2.8 billion, although the rate of issuance has declined as the year has progressed (see 
Spanish institutions, in 
particular the biggest ones, 
have been able to issue 
debt on international 
markets, ... 
...while the resort to State 
guarantees has been less 
intense, although this 
guarantee facility is open to 
June this year. 
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Chapter 3). In this respect, several institutions will conceivably make use of the guarantee 
lines still available up to June 2010, albeit to a different degree, according to their 
respective funding needs and ability to tap the markets. 
 
As has traditionally been the case, Spanish institutions’ debt issues are mostly medium and 
long-term, attenuating the debt refinancing risk. In this respect, and as noted in previous 
FSRs, the wholesale funding of Spanish institutions, concentrated on the medium and long 
term, reduces the risk of raising funds in what is still a difficult time in the international financial 
markets. Thus, as shown in Chart 2.5.C, 60% of medium and long-term debt held by 
Spanish institutions matures as from 2014. Moreover, including commercial paper makes no 
significant change to the maturity calendar, apart from a logical but moderate increase in the 
shorter term maturities. 
 
Similarly to other euro area institutions, Spanish deposit institutions have been obtaining more 
funds from the ECB (Eurosystem net lending) since the onset of the crisis. However, the 
volume of funds thus obtained is in line with the relative size of the Spanish economy (capital 
key6) and, after an initial rebound when the international financial crisis first broke, it has 
remained close to that benchmark level (Chart 2.5.D). As indicated earlier, in terms of the 
consolidated balance sheet, this value is only a small proportion (2% in December 2009). 
 
The international financial crisis has prompted dramatic changes in the wholesale funding 
markets in comparison with the situation before summer 2007. In this setting, Spanish 
deposit institutions have stepped up their efforts to attract deposits, thus strengthening 
their traditionally sound retail funding base. 
 
Over the years previous to the international financial crisis, Spanish deposit institutions had 
tapped the international financial markets to fund part of the growth in their activity, resulting 
in a decrease in their deposits relative to credit granted. But this trend reversed in July 2008; 
since then, the year-on-year change in the ratio of deposits over credit of firms and 
households has been positive (Chart 2.6.A). 
 
6. The capital key is the percentage share of each national central bank in the capital of the ECB. 
The term structure of 
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concentrated in the medium 
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The continued rate of growth of deposits won from non-financial corporations and 
households declined somewhat in 2009, due to the fact that it had risen uninterruptedly 
in recent years and to the unfavourable economic environment facing Spanish firms and 
households. The lower interest rates as from end-2008 prompted a readjustment in the 
respective rates of growth of time and demand deposits. Thus, time deposit growth rates 
declined from almost 30% between late 2007 and late 2008 to negative growth rates in 
year-on-year terms in the last three months of 2009, a pattern that was offset in part by 
the opposite performance of demand deposit growth rates (Chart 2.6.B). 
 
In comparison with other euro area countries, and in particular with the euro area as a 
whole, the rate of growth of Spanish institutions’ deposits has converged towards the 
euro area average, having risen at a significantly faster pace throughout the previous 
quarters. 
 
The persistent difficulties involved in accessing international funding markets and the need for 
institutions to readjust their liabilities, raising the relative weight of their deposits, is intensifying 
the competition to attract firms’ and households’ savings, especially in a setting in which 
other savings products (for example, investment and pension funds) appear to be overcoming 
the difficulties faced in the last two years. This growing competition to attract deposits also 
reflects the structural characteristics of the Spanish banking market, and especially its high 
degree of competition. Spanish deposit institutions will need to adapt their business 
strategies to this new situation, as it seems unlikely that the growing competition in this 
market segment will reverse in the short term. 
… although the growth rate 
of deposits has been less 
sharp in recent months ... 
... with the attendant rate of 
change falling in step with 
those recorded for the euro 
area as a whole. 
There is heightened 
competition to raise 
deposits, and this will persist 
insofar as institutions adapt 
their business strategies to  
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Spanish deposit institutions reported consolidated group profit of €18.56 billion in 2009, down 
19.7% on a year earlier (Table 2.2). This resulted in a decline in ROA from 0.73% in December 
2008 to 0.54% in December 2009 (in pre-tax terms, from 0.91% to 0.66%). The lower profit 
also put downward pressure on ROE, which stood at 9% in December 2009 (in comparison 
with 12.9% in December 2008). This reduction in ROE was general across all institutions, 
although with different rates of decline and different absolute levels in each case (Chart 2.7.A). 
 
The fall-off in consolidated profit is due to contrasting patterns in recurring income and 
loan loss provisions. Thus, net operating income rose by 18% year-on-year (by 13 bp in 
terms of average total assets (ATA), to 1.77% in December 2009), while impairment 
losses, including those from specific and general provisions and those connected with 
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY 
 
Deposit institutions’ income 
is 19.7% down on the 
previous year ... 
 
... as the rise in recurring 
income has been offset by 
the increase in loan loss 
provisions. 
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asset foreclosures (see Box 2.3), rose by 65% versus December 2008, representing an 
increase of 40 bp in terms of ATA to 1.18% (Chart 2.7.B). Impairment losses are 
detracting a growing proportion of net operating income (67% in December 2009; see 
Chart 2.7.C), and although this is a significant and widespread impact, differences 
between different institutions remain. 
 
Net operating income at Spanish deposit institutions has been driven primarily by net 
interest income, but also by the improvement vis-à-vis December 2008 in net gains and 
losses on financial assets and liabilities (which were very low at that date, as international 
Net operating income has 
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financial markets headed down) and by the relatively moderate performance of operating 
expenses (Chart 2.8.A). 
 
Net interest income was up 22.7% year-on-year at December 2009, an increase of 
23 bp in terms of ATA to 2.04%. However, in quarterly terms, net interest income 
decelerated throughout 2009 (Chart 2.8.B). Previous FSRs had already envisaged that 
net interest income would be unlikely to continue to post the growth rates seen in 
previous quarters, and the current trend will foreseeably continue in coming quarters, not 
only because activity is likely to remain flat, but also because the positive impact of lower 
interest rates, which are generally reflected in the cost of debt before they are passed 
through to rates applied to loans, will disappear.  
 
Moreover, competition for deposits among Spanish deposit institutions has become more 
fierce, as is reflected in the higher interest rates offered on new deposits. Chart 2.8.C shows 
that rates applied to new deposits, which had been heading down since 2008 Q3, rebounded 
in 2009 Q4, exceeding EURIBOR. Against the present backdrop of fierce competition for 
deposits, EURIBOR may well have ceased to serve as a valid benchmark for comparing 
institutions’ retail funding costs, especially considering the stable spread between rates applied 
to loans and deposits, although this spread has tended to narrow in recent months. 
 
The quarterly performance of the main components of net operating income also shows 
continued flat commission income and limited cuts in operating expenses (Chart 2.8.B). In 
fact, operating expenses post a year-on-year rate of growth of 6.9%, down 3 bp in terms of 
ATA to 1.35% (Table 2.2). Nevertheless, excluding one of the large institutions that has 
recorded above average increases due to recent acquisitions that distort the year-on-year 
comparison, operating expenses are more contained (-0.9%). 
 
Given the pressure on income statements discussed earlier, each institution will have to 
assess, in an appropriate manner, whether or not the process of adjustment in terms of 
operating expenses is sufficient. In this respect, branch numbers have fallen since end-2008 
(Chart 2.8.D), but nowhere near enough to offset previous openings. The process of 
adjustment of operating expenses will foreseeably have to be redoubled, probably with 
greater emphasis on cost savings at institutions’ central services. 
... but the marked rate of 
increase of the latter will 
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Furthermore, against a backdrop of flat growth in real activity, continued pressure from loan 
losses and a certain degree of exhaustion in the strong rate of growth of net interest income, 
Spanish deposit institutions will have to undertake intense restructuring. It seems inevitable 
that the Spanish banking industry, and especially the weaker institutions, will have to become 
more streamlined, to adapt to the new national and international context. 
 
 
  
LOSS SIMULATION EXERCISES                  BOX 2.5 
 
Since the onset of the international financial crisis, numerous 
international organisations and private sector analysts in financial 
institutions and agencies have compiled and published estimates of 
potential losses on banks’ portfolios and their impact on the institutions, 
in particular in terms of whether or not they would need to raise 
additional own funds to continue pursuing their banking business. 
 
On several occasions, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) 
has released aggregate estimates of expected losses on banks’ 
balance sheets for the US and the European banking systems. The ECB 
also recently published its aggregate estimates. In the United States, a 
stress test was conducted, on a case-by-case basis for each institution, 
to assess the impact of the crisis and to determine whether or not they 
would need to recapitalise or shore up their capital. The CEBS has 
conducted similar exercises on the big European banks, although the 
findings of these tests have not been published. 
 
Although there are – sometimes significant – methodological differences 
between these loss simulation exercises or stress tests, the basic 
outline is generally similar. The first step is to estimate the expected 
default [in the form of probabilities of default (PD) or doubtful assets 
ratios] on the investments held on institutions’ bank balance sheets. 
These losses are sometimes estimated using structural models of the 
behaviour of key economic variables and their impact on credit quality, 
or by estimating simple relationships between doubtful assets or 
probabilities of default and the economic variables affecting them (GDP 
rate of change, interest rates, unemployment rates, indebtedness, etc.). 
Projections of default or of expected losses may be made on the basis 
of these hypotheses.  
 
A comparison is drawn below between these losses and the 
institutions’ coverage thereof. Specific and general loan loss provisions 
are analysed first. If these are insufficient, the next step is to examine 
the extent to which the income statements are able to absorb losses, 
which is usually estimated by means of hypotheses and simple 
relationships between the income statement headings and the main 
aggregate variables. 
 
Lastly, if net operating income, earnings or capital gains from asset 
disposals, where appropriate, are not sufficient to meet all the losses, 
the impact on institutions’ own funds is obtained, together with the 
additional own funds requirements, given the minimum target for 
institutions’ solvency ratios. 
 
The Banco de España has conducted simulation exercises on several 
occasions, both since the onset of the crisis and earlier. It has also 
collaborated closely in exercises conducted at the European level, and at 
the request of international organisations. The findings of some of these 
exercises have appeared in the FSR or in other publications (Notas de 
Estabilidad Financiera, no. 5, December 2006, in the case of the exercises 
conducted under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)). 
 
The results of the simulation exercises or stress tests performed by the 
Banco de España, or by any other organisation or private analyst, are 
usually very sensitive to the assumptions used, to the detail of the 
available information and to the timeframe over which the relationships 
between the most significant variables in the exercise are estimated. 
Therefore, the results of these simulations must be interpreted with 
caution, both if the results show high losses and if they show a very 
high resilience, with hardly any impact on the institutions. Furthermore, 
at the level of individual institutions there may be enormous differences 
in terms of impact, with some institutions hardly affected and others 
needing a highly substantial amount of capital, even so as to hold the 
minimum levels required by the regulator. 
 
The losses estimated in the various exercises published by the main 
international organisations range between 15% and 35% of the capital 
of the banking system or of the group of institutions considered. Thus, 
in the December 2009 edition of its Financial Stability Review, the ECB 
estimated potential losses for the euro area of 15% of capital, after 
considering the volume of existing provisions but excluding the ability to 
absorb losses through profits. In its October 2009 edition of the GFSR, 
the IMF estimated an impact of 35% for the United States and 23% for 
the euro area (also after taking into account the volume of provisions 
but not of profits). In the United States the stress test exercise (SCAP, 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program) conducted in May 2009 put 
the volume of losses as a percentage of capital at 13% (although in this 
case existing provisions and projected future profits were included). It 
can be seen, in short, that the percentages vary significantly depending 
on the information, the assumptions and the relationships considered. 
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the crisis on Spanish institutions and, in 
particular, on their potential additional capital needs, it is necessary to estimate 
doubtful assets and probabilities of default and compare them with existing 
loan loss provisions and current and future income. Alternatively, it is possible 
to evaluate the resilience of the Spanish banking system at aggregate level by 
comparing the range of losses estimated in the various exercises conducted 
internationally with the funds available for the bank restructuring process in 
Spain. The FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks) envisages, if 
necessary, making available up to €99 bn of capital to inject into troubled 
institutions, equivalent to 46% of the own funds existing as at December 2009. 
This figure amply covers the worst-case scenario for losses considered 
internationally as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, the worst-
case scenario did not take into account the existence of profits to cushion part 
of the amount of the potential losses. 
The sector, and certain 
institutions in particular, 
must undertake 
restructuring on a greater 
scale. 
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On 2009 earnings, Spain’s big banks recorded higher returns on total assets than their 
international peers (Chart 2.9.A). The lesser impact of the international financial crisis on 
Spain’s large banks reflects their virtually zero exposure to the highly complex, non-
transparent instruments that have put pressure on the income statements of most of the 
big European and US banks. Like their Spanish peers, these institutions are now facing a 
deterioration in the real economy, which will foreseeably continue to exert downward pressure 
on their income statements.7 
 
In terms of stock market performance, the large Spanish banks have outperformed their 
European peers since the international financial crisis intensified in September 2008. 
However, since the start of 2010 the tables have turned, with the European banks 
outperforming the Spanish ones. This may be partly because the doubts about the 
severity of the economic crisis in Spain are taking toll on investors’ perception of the large 
Spanish institutions, despite their high level of geographical diversification. The contagion 
effect of the difficulties in Greece, and the uncertainty generated in this respect, especially 
in February, is also behind this contrasting performance, which is consistent with that of 
the CDS spreads (Chart 2.5.A). 
 
As a whole Spanish deposit institutions ended 2009 showing stronger own funds. The 
solvency ratio stood comfortably above 8%, the regulatory minimum requirement. Thus, the 
total solvency ratio was 12.2%, almost 1 pp above that at end-20088 (Chart 2.10.A).  
 
The strengthening of Spanish institutions' solvency has been particularly robust in terms of their 
top quality own funds. For instance, the tier 1 ratio increased 1.3 pp to 9.7%, while the core  
 
7. The potential losses facing the different banking systems as a consequence of the international economic and financial 
crisis, and their ability to meet these losses, have been studied and estimated by numerous international organisations and 
analysts in recent years. Box 2.5 addresses this question.     8. The data for December 2008 and December 2009 were 
calculated according to Banco de España Circular CBE 3/2008, which transposes into Spanish law the EU Directives 
including the changes introduced by Basel II on solvency regulations. 
Comparison of the biggest 
Spanish banks’ income with 
that of their international peers 
holds up relatively well … 
...although their stock 
market performance since 
the start of the year has 
been relatively worse, due in 
part to uncertainty over the 
Spanish economy and the 
contagion effects of the 
Greek situation. 
2.1.3 SOLVENCY 
Spanish institutions 
substantially strengthened 
their solvency ratios...  
... and, especially, tier 1 and 
core capital, which include 
top quality capital. 
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capital ratio, which measures the weight of top quality tier 1 capital (capital and reserves net of 
goodwill) in risk weighted assets, also rose by almost 1 pp from 7.1% to 8.1%. The 
disaggregated analysis shows that solvency increased for a high number of institutions (Chart 
2.10.B). 
 
Such a significant strengthening of the tier 1 ratio and, in particular, of the more demanding 
core capital ratio reflects the efforts made by Spanish deposit institutions to increase their 
resilience in the current difficult climate. Further and equally important, it places institutions in a 
favourable position for undertaking the highly demanding changes which the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision is introducing in its stricter definition of capital and tighter requirements 
for the capital that financial institutions must hold in future (see Chapter 3). 
 
The above-mentioned changes in solvency were due to a slight decline in risk weighted assets 
and, especially, a notable increase in own funds. 
 
Risk weighted assets, the denominator in the calculation of the solvency ratio, fell by 0.2% in 
December 2009, as a result of the restraint in lending (Chart 2.11.A). Thus, credit risk 
requirements, by far those with the greatest weight, stagnated and grew 36 bp, following the 
notable slowdown in December 2008 (-10.7%). Among the other requirements, only those for 
operational risk grew (8.5%), while those for market risk fell 3.1%. 
 
Credit risk requirements performed very differently on the basis of whether the standardised or 
the IRB approach was followed by credit institutions in their calculations. Thus, whereas the 
requirements obtained from using the standardised approach, whose weight in total requirements 
was 63.5% at end-2009, decreased 2.1%, the risk requirements under the IRB method 
increased by 5%. The growth of requirements for the retail portfolio (8.9%) – comprising loans to 
individuals and SMEs, against a background of deteriorating economic activity – and for equity 
securities (22.6%), following a year of recovery for stock markets, were the main factors 
explaining the changes in requirements according to the IRB method (Chart 2.11.B). 
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The growth rate of total own funds (the numerator of the solvency ratio) quickened to 8.3%, 
slightly more than double the rate in December 2008 (4%). The strong increase in tier 1 capital 
(15.5%, 6.4 pp higher than a year earlier) counterbalanced a further, albeit smaller, fall in tier 2 
capital (-5.3%, in comparison with -21.6% in 2008) and the rise in deductions (32%) (Chart 
2.12.A). 
 
Growth of tier 1 capital accelerated due to the sound performance of all its positive 
components and in spite of the increase in goodwill (13.5%), arising from recent acquisitions 
(Chart 2.12.B). In particular, Spanish institutions strengthened their own funds by issuing 
... but especially by the 
strong growth of own 
funds,... 
...mainly top quality own 
funds. 
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preference shares (which grew 28.3%, representing a quickening of around 10 pp) and, mainly, 
by substantially increasing reserves (15.6%) and, to a lesser degree, capital (6.4%).  
 
The drop in tier 2 capital eased as a result of a smaller decline in almost all of its components 
and, in particular, of general provisions (Chart 2.12.C). The rise in doubtful loans triggered an 
increase in specific provisions. In turn, this prompted a fall in general provisions negatively 
impacting eligible provisions. 
 
As mentioned above, Spanish deposit institutions substantially strengthened their solvency 
ratios and, in particular, tier 1 capital. The international financial crisis has underlined how 
institutions with high solvency ratios have required quite strong intervention by public 
authorities. Aside from other considerations, this reflects that the risk associated with certain 
assets, in particular some of which are in the trading book and include a high credit risk, had 
not been sufficiently covered. Similarly, it shows the high leverage levels (measured as the 
inverse of the ratio of own funds, capital and reserves, to total non-weighted assets) which, in 
many cases, are precisely seen at institutions with higher regulatory capital ratios and larger 
trading books. The work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see Chapter 3) aims 
to remedy these and other deficiencies. In any event, if the own funds to total assets ratios (the 
inverse of the leverage ratio) of the largest Spanish institutions is compared with those of other 
European banks, the former are in a relatively advantageous position (Chart 2.12.D).  
 
The European insurance sector, whose profits and solvency, have come under downward 
pressure due to the international financial and economic crisis, currently faces different risks. 
The most striking of these risks is probably the financial risk, in so far as stock markets may still 
experience difficulties and interest rates may remain at low levels. A further risk stems from the 
economic situation, which puts downward pressure on business volume, and upward pressure 
on the number of claims, particularly in the industrial segments. 
 
The Spanish insurance sector must also face the adverse economic situation, although the 
financial risks affect it to a lesser degree and, in particular, the situation of the real estate and 
stock markets. This is explained, as already indicated in previous FSRs, by the balance sheet 
structure that is characteristic of insurance companies in Spain, in which exposure to real 
estate and equity securities is relatively low. 
Spanish institutions 
compare favourably with 
European banks in terms of 
own funds to assets. 
2.2 Insurance companies, 
investment funds and 
pension funds 
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The most recent available data and market information show a slowdown in the volume of 
premiums recorded in 2009 in comparison with 2008. While the year-on-year increase in the 
volume of premiums in the life segment is estimated to be around 5.8%, bolstered by savings 
products, negative rates of change are projected in the non-life segment (around -2.6%). The 
unfavourable business performance of the non-life segment is associated with multirisk home 
insurance, which is linked to a large extent to housing loans, and especially with the year-on-
year decline in premiums in the automobile segment (-5.4%), whose weight in the total 
premiums of the non-life segment is around 40%, and with the performance of insurance for 
SMEs. In any event, available market data for the insurance sector as a whole indicate that the 
solvency margins for the life and non-life segments are relatively high, above the minimum level 
required. 
 
Following a strong reduction in the assets managed by Spanish investment funds as a result of 
the international financial market crisis and, probably, the impact of increased competition for 
savings from credit institutions, these assets stabilised in the closing months of 2009 (Chart 
2.13.A). Favourable contributions to this were the slight improvement in returns, but mainly the 
lower rate of decline in net subscriptions, which even posted positive values (namely, the funds 
contributed exceeded the funds withdrawn) in some months of 2009 (Chart 2.13.B). 
 
 
 
… which is concentrated on 
weak growth in premium 
volumes, in particular in the 
non-life segment, although 
the aggregate solvency 
margin is above the required 
minimum. 
A recovery was seen in 
investment funds' assets 
and, in particular, in net 
subscriptions. 
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3   Other issues 
 
 
 
Since the international financial crisis began, different measures have been taken by public 
authorities on two different fronts: on the one hand, those aimed at softening the impact of 
the financial crisis in the short term and, on the other, those targeting reform of many areas of 
international financial regulation. This chapter analyses these two issues, firstly, by reviewing 
recent developments in and the current status of the exceptional measures adopted by 
governments and central banks. Secondly, the changes proposed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which will have a significant impact for financial institutions 
worldwide, will be examined. 
 
As for extraordinary unconventional measures, in the United States financial sector support 
initiatives reached a significant volume, although recently some of them have been withdrawn. 
From mid-2009 certain measures were gradually wound down; for example, guarantees for 
bank debt issues which ended definitively in October of that year. Furthermore, institutions 
began to return capital injections as they obtained own funds from the markets. However, 
some important programmes still remain in force, for example, the mortgage modification and 
refinancing programme, the programme for recapitalisation of the Federal mortgage 
securitisation agencies and the capital injection into AIG. As for asset purchases, the 
projected volume of asset-backed securities and government bonds were acquired and it 
does not seem likely that the authorities will sell these portfolios imminently which entails, 
among other things, the Federal Reserve maintaining a bloated balance sheet. Lastly, new 
actions have been proposed which, unlike the previous ones, target more specific segments. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the amount of aid (in the form of capital injections and guarantees) 
soon reached high ratios in relation to GDP (Charts 3.1.A and 3.1.B). As a result of the 
improvement in financial markets, some of the measures aimed at the financial sector as a 
whole were used less frequently, however, guarantees and capital support for specific large 
institutions were maintained and even increased, signifying that there has been no decrease 
in their size overall. During the last six months, there have been no signs that liquidity support 
channelled through the Bank of England will be exhausted. 
 
In the euro area, the improvement in financial markets prompted a slight reduction in the 
Eurosystem's balance sheet and enabled the ECB to announce in December that it would 
begin to withdraw unconventional measures. To date this has been achieved through the 
elimination of 12-month and six-month tenders, as well as the supplementary three-month 
tenders. Nevertheless, the ECB's main refinancing operations with full allotment of liquidity will 
continue as long as is needed, and at least until 12 October 2010. Also, to date covered 
bond purchases amounting to €41 bn have been made, as part of the Eurosystem's €60 bn 
programme ending mid-2010. 
 
The use of state guarantees for the issuance of securities by banks was very uneven across 
countries and peaked at 10% of GDP around July 2009. This ratio stabilised subsequently. 
Unless new extensions are requested, several guarantee programmes will expire in June 
2010. Injections of public capital in euro area countries also varied; these have slowed 
recently and the programmes in some countries have even ended. Furthermore, several large 
banks began to return the funds early. 
 
In Spain the programme involving the purchase of top quality assets (the Fund for the 
Acquisition of Financial Assets - FAAF) was no longer in use from the beginning of 2009, and  
In the United States the 
gradual withdrawal of some 
extraordinary support 
measures, introduced to 
alleviate the effects of the 
financial crisis, has begun… 
as has occurred in the 
United Kingdom, although in 
this case support for larger 
institutions has continued. 
The Eurosystem has also 
withdrawn some measures, 
but full allotment of liquidity 
will continue as long as 
deemed necessary. 
In Spain the use of 
guarantees is gradually  
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further operations are not envisaged. As in the other areas analysed, guarantees for banks' 
fixed-income security issues gradually decreased. In principle, guaranteed issues with 
maturity up to five years may be made until 30 June 2010. Lastly, there have been no 
injections of public capital to date in Spain, although within the framework of the Fund for the 
Orderly Restructuring of Banks (FROB), institutions which merge may, under certain 
conditions, request this type of support from the FROB, until June of this year.1  
 
In conclusion, in the international arena a process has begun to withdraw or temper 
some financial system support measures, in a setting in which, if continued, they could 
foreseeably have negative effects on competition and the efficiency of financial systems. 
In any event, the withdrawal of these exceptional measures is a very difficult economic 
policy decision. 
 
Throughout 2009 the BCBS worked intensively and published rules, guides and consultative 
documents to combat the shortcomings related to the regulation, supervision and risk 
management of banks brought to light by the financial crisis, thus responding to the call 
made by the G-20. 
 
In July 2009 the BCBS published the first raft of measures to strengthen the capital accord 
(see the previous FSR in this regard). However, the most important changes proposed due to 
their strong ramifications for financial institutions are those included in two documents 
published in December 2009,2 which refer to the areas of capital and liquidity. In the sphere of 
capital they cover the following: 
 
 
1. In the context of the restructuring process of the Spanish banking system, Institutional Protection Schemes are being 
hotly debated (see Box 3.1).      2. Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, and International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring. 
becoming less intense and, 
to date, there have been no 
injections of public capital. 
The withdrawal of measures 
is at present one of the most 
difficult economic policy 
decisions globally. 
The BCBS is working 
intensively on matters 
related to the prudential 
supervision of... 
... capital ... 
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1. Raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base, defining and 
tightening the compulsory criteria for top quality capital.  
 
2. Enhancing risk coverage. Among others, capital requirements for counterparty credit risk 
are strengthened and the incentives are increased so that OTC derivative exposures are 
cleared at central counterparties.  
 
3. Introducing a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II solvency ratio. 
 
4. Introducing a series of measures to reduce procyclicality. It is proposed that institutions 
have a capital buffer built up with a charge to retained earnings that can be drawn upon in 
periods of stress. Furthermore, the creation of an additional countercyclical buffer is being 
designed, to be provisioned solely at times of excessive credit growth. Lastly, it is proposed 
that provisions are made on the basis of expected losses (see Box 2.4). 
 
As for liquidity risk, the second document proposes a quantitative framework for the 
measurement and coverage of liquidity risk in the form of two standards and a set of 
quantitative supervisory tools to monitor this risk. The standards included in this document 
are as follows: 
 
1. Liquidity Coverage Ratio. Its objective is that banks hold highly liquid assets to cover their 
liquidity needs in a stress scenario during a one-month survival period. The document deems 
that cash and government debt securities are “highly liquid assets”, although this question still 
remains open. The liquidity needs to be covered are defined as 100% of the net cash flow 
under a common predetermined stress scenario. 
 
2. Net Stable Funding Ratio. It is more structural and its objective is to cover institutions' 
liquidity needs using stable sources of financing with the basic aim of preventing short-term 
funding of long-term assets. 
 
During 2010 H1 the impact of the proposals on institutions, markets and financial stability will 
be studied which, together with the industry's comments on the consultative documents, will 
be used to decide on the definitive design of the measures and how they will be gauged. The 
raft of measures will be defined by the end of 2010 and will be introduced gradually with the 
objective of them being applied by the end of 2012. In any event, and as discussed above, 
the full package of reforms proposed by the BCBS will foreseeably have a substantial impact 
on international financial institutions. 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION SCHEMES (IPSs)                   BOX 3.1 
 
Article 80 of the Capital Requirements Directive makes the first reference 
to IPSs, defining these systems as “a contractual or statutory liability 
arrangement which protects those institutions and in particular ensures 
their liquidity and solvency to avoid bankruptcy in case it becomes 
necessary”. 
 
The Banco de España Solvency Circular 3/2008 is the last stage in the 
process of transposing the Directive into Spanish law, which naturally 
involved the amendment of Law 13/1985 and the enactment of Royal 
Decree 216/2008. A reference to IPSs is also included in the preamble to 
Royal Decree 9/2009 on the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks. 
 
Under the Law, Royal Decree and Directive, it is possible to assign a 0% 
risk weighting to exposures to counterparties which are part of the 
lender's IPS. 
 
It should be clarified, nonetheless, that the Directive was promoted by 
certain European groups (of savings banks and cooperatives) whose 
... and liquidity. 
Aside from the impact 
studies under way, the 
magnitude of the reforms 
will have a marked effect on 
financial institutions. 
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structure was not based on a parent-subsidiary relationship. Thus, the 
Directive did not create IPSs, but merely regulated the status of a set of 
associations which had already been safeguarding their members' 
solvency and liquidity and which, thereafter, were able to release capital. 
 
For an IPS to exist, there must be a “contractual or statutory liability 
arrangement”, that is, a solidarity arrangement whereby the members of a 
group undertake to support each other, in terms of liquidity and solvency, 
if necessary. 
 
In view of the scope, nature, depth and coverage of these solidarity 
arrangements, since there is no subsequent specific regulation, the 
varieties of IPSs are almost infinite. However, they can be classified into 
two main groups: 1) Narrowly defined IPSs, which are groups of 
institutions whose solidarity arrangements do not establish legally binding 
mutual support commitments. 2) Strengthened IPSs, which are groups of 
institutions whose solidarity arrangements define legally binding sound 
contractual commitments. 
 
Strengthened IPSs are, therefore, a category above narrowly defined IPSs 
in so far as protection of their members is concerned, since the latter are 
de jure and the former are de facto systems. Moreover, a key feature of 
strengthened IPSs is a central body which combines cash management, 
product development and group strategic planning and results in a loss of 
members' autonomy. However, this central body is much less specific at 
narrowly defined IPSs. 
 
The essential and immediate consequence of the differences described 
above is that, in most cases, strengthened IPSs are considered groups 
for regulatory purposes. Accordingly, supervision is conducted at group 
level, rather than individually as in the case of narrowly defined IPSs. 
Both kinds of IPSs may take advantage of 0% risk weighting between 
their members. 
The Banco de España has resolved to establish a series of conditions, in 
addition to those already contemplated in the Circular 3/2008, to be met 
by IPSs in order for them to be considered strengthened and deemed to 
be groups for regulatory purposes. Accordingly it is essential that: 
 
1) The commitment to joint and several solvency extends to at least 40% 
of each participating institution’s eligible own funds. 
 
2) There is a central, single management, body to monitor institutions’ 
solvency and liquidity. 
 
3) There is, within said body, professional and non-assembly-based single 
management, endowed with the appropriate resources. 
 
4) This management is responsible for complying with the regulatory 
consolidated reporting requirements. 
 
5) The system has the necessary devices for the monitoring and 
classification of risk. 
 
6) There is a minimum term of ten years, with severe penalties to deter 
members from leaving the schemes. 
 
7) Institutions mutualise at least 40% of their earnings, thereby sharing in 
joint business income. 
 
8) The integration programme covers all the above aspects, together with 
significant events and a specific detailed implementation schedule. 
 
In short, according to each specific case, IPSs may prove appropriate for 
certain institutions. In any case, in order to ensure that the resultant legal 
constructs may be considered groups for regulatory purposes, the Banco 
de España has strengthened the requirements in this respect. 
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